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6.1  Introduction 
Many papers have been written on the issue of  “high” Japanese household 
savings relative to other OECD countries, though some controversy remains 
about exactly how high savings are (the statistical measurement problem) and 
why they are so high. 
Hayashi (1  986) wrote a seminal paper correcting some statistical differences 
between Japanese and U.S. government statistics. Hayashi, Ando, and Ferris 
(1988) further studied Japanese household savings using the National Survey 
of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE). Horioka (1990) wrote a survey 
on the issue from the viewpoint of different motives for saving, in which he 
considered more than 30 factors to explain Japanese saving behavior. Ito (1992, 
chap. 9) and Hayashi (1992) provided overviews of the issues. 
Among various aspects of Japanese saving, considerable attention has been 
paid to saving by  the Japanese elderly. From various surveys, it appears that 
they do not spend down their savings. They even appear to continue accumulat- 
ing wealth, particularly housing wealth, throughout their retirement years. 
There are three issues involved. First, this “observation” may reflect a statisti- 
cal problem. Many surveys are conducted on the basis of household heads, but 
many (poor) elderly are merged into the households of offspring. Thus, what 
we see in the elderly are biased samples. Second, the elderly may indeed save 
at a high rate to accumulate funds bequests or for sudden illness, of  which 
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some are destined to become “accidental bequests.” Third, most of the savings 
of retired people are in the form of housing, and have thus accumulated unreal- 
ized capital gains. It may be difficult to spend down home equity, since the 
capital market does not seem to offer perfect annuity contracts. In this paper, 
tax incentives, related to the elderly ’s  portfolio choices, will be discussed in 
detail. 
We  will place special emphasis on an examination of  the relationship be- 
tween tax incentives and saving. In the 1980s,  both Japan and the United States 
enacted tax reforms, though with opposite intents. A quite notable change in 
Japanese capital taxation was the elimination of maruyu accounts (except for 
the handicapped, the elderly, and other special groups) in April 1988. Interest 
income is now taxed at 20 percent. A degree of tax credit for mortgage (hous- 
ing loan) interest payments has been enlarged in Japan, so that borrowing for 
housing is encouraged. In the United States, however, the tax deductibility of 
loan and mortgage payments has been severely limited by  tax reforms in the 
1980s. Interest payments on home mortgages, which used to be fully deduct- 
ible (when itemized), are now deductible only when applied to a principal 
residence or a second house. Interest payments for consumer loans, which used 
to be fully deductible (when itemized), are now only partially deductible. 
Apart from tax incentives, since the early Meiji era the Japanese government 
has engaged in a variety of activities designed to promote saving. The postal 
saving system, established in 1875, was one of the most important instruments 
used to cultivate the public’s appreciation of savings. Since the Second World 
War, the Japanese government has continued to engage in saving-promotion 
activities, in part through the Saving Promotion Department of the Bank of 
Japan (established in 1946), the Central Council for Saving Promotion (estab- 
lished in 1952), and the Saving Promotion Center of the Ministry of Finance 
(established in  1957). More recently, however, these committees have shifted 
the emphasis from saving to sound household management, including the 
avoidance of personal bankruptcy. The impact of  saving-promotion activities 
on household saving is difficult to measure, but it appears that such activities 
have been much more pervasive in Japan than in other countries. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2  presents an overview of Japa- 
nese household saving, with discussions of frequently used data sets and statis- 
tical measurement problems. Section 6.3 presents a comprehensive survey of 
tax incentives for household saving. In particular, incentives before and after 
the tax reform of April 1988 are compared. Section 6.4 is devoted to a survey 
of household portfolio selection over time. In section 6.5, we discuss tax incen- 
tives affecting the behavior of the elderly, including incentives for bequests. 
Section 6.6 concludes the paper with a summary. 
6.2  Overview of Household Saving 
The Japanese household sector provides funds in the form of  savings for 
investment in the corporate sector, the government sector, and foreign countries 135  Public Policies and Household Saving in Japan 
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Source: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts (Tokyo, 1992). 
Note: The sectoral balance is calculated as a saving surplus (it., saving minus investment) in the 
household, government, and corporate sectors. The current accounts absorb the domestic saving 
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(see fig. 6.1). Although the saving-investment identity does not  imply any 
causal relationship, the following observations can be made: (1) high savings 
generally reduce the capital cost of  investment, because they tend to make 
funds available to financial intermediaries  at a lower interest rate; (2) high sav- 
ings are likely to be accompanied by high investment; (3) high savings imply 
a tendency to run trade surpluses rather than deficits; and (4) high savings can 
finance government deficits without causing a high interest rate or borrowing 
from abroad. 
This picture might lead one to criticize Japan’s high savings as a cause of 
trade imbalance. The causal connection from excessive savings to trade imbal- 
ance, however, seems to be rather remote and seems to rely on various assump- 
tions. In this paper, rather than debate whether savings cause trade imbalances, 
we will focus on household saving behavior itself-namely,  on what factors 
determine household savings and how government policy influences the house- 
hold saving decision. 
In fact, the household sector faces three kinds of constraints. First, the mac- 
roeconomic environment determines income, inflation rate, current account 
balance, interest rate, and the like. Second, structural factors such as aging and 
financial market liberalization make the household sector adjust its behavioral 
pattern. Third, public policy, especially taxation, imposes a constraint on the 
household sector’s budget. The household saving decision is formed by these 136  Takatoshi It0 and Yukinobu Kitamura 
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Fig. 6.2  Household saving rates in Japan (National Accounts and microdata), 
Sources: SNA accounts from Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts 
(Tokyo, various issues); FIES data from the FIES for various years. 
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environments, and no factor seems to play  a dominant role. Bearing this in 
mind, researchers have to be careful to select a data set which matches their 
research agenda. A good example is in figure 6.2, which shows two series of 
the household saving rate in Japan. It is clear that the two series went in oppo- 
site directions in the 1980s. One could argue that the Japanese household sav- 
ing rate was increasing over the 1980s if one uses the FIES data, but one would 
argue the opposite if one uses the National Accounts data. The divergence of 
the two data series has given rise to a recent research topic.' 
It is well known that statistical adjustment for consumer durables makes 
the US.-Japan  household saving rate gap much lower (see Hayashi 1986). If, 
however, savings are defined as the change in a stock of wealth, as argued by 
Bradford (1991), the U.S.-Japan household saving rate gap may have widened 
in the 1980s. In sum, the definition of savings and the statistical adjustment of 
it are crucial for policy analysis. 
Table 6.1 presents a picture of the average household balance sheet. In gen- 
eral, Japanese households keep a high proportion of savings in time deposits, 
1. The two statistics cover different samples-the  FIES does not include one-person households 
and self-employed workers. The treatment of liabilities (mainly housing loans) is also different. 
However, a satisfactory explanation for such a large divergence is yet to be made. 137  Public Policies and Household Saving in Japan 
Table 6.1  Composition of Household Net Worth (10,000 yen) 
1979  1984  1989 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Financial Assets  496  306  676  414 
Demand deposit  57  30  53  25 
Time deposit  237  120  328  172 
Life insurance  86  54  128  80 
Securities  99  0  I40  0 
Nonfinancial institutions  18  0  27  0 
Liabilities  170  4  268  15 
Housing loans (mortgages)  144  0  232  0 
Others  26  0  36  0 





















Source: NSFIE for 1979, 1984, and 1989. 
Note: The data covers all households in Japan. 
although the proportions of life insurance and securities have  risen over the 
years. The same, but less obvious, trends can be observed in median house- 
holds. The biggest difference between mean and median households lies in 
securities (mainly stocks). This implies that securities are distributed heavily 
among wealthy households. As to the balance between savings and liabilities, 
the mean household is more heavily in debt than the median household. In the 
case of  the mean household, housing loans (mortgages) account for over 80 
percent of total liabilities. In terms of numbers, those who have liabilities ac- 
count for 54.2 percent of all households, and those with mortgages were 34.8 
percent of the total in  1989. 
Table 6.2 indicates the concentration of wealth among Japanese households. 
The general picture remains more or less the same, although the distribution 
worsens between 1984 and 1989. The reason for this is undoubtedly the boom 
in the stock and land markets in the late 1980s. Including real estate and dura- 
bles in total wealth improves the distribution, as shown in column (ii) for 1989. 
This is probably because homeownership is widespread across households. 
The effect of  the Nakasone-Takeshita tax reform (1988/89) can not be fully 
identified in the 1989 survey because it had been implemented too recently. 
The following is a brief outline of  data sources on household savings in 
Japan. To begin with macroeconomic data, aggregate time-series data is usu- 
ally obtained from the Annual Report on National Accounts, which contains 
data on disposable income, so that the household saving rate can be calculated 
(and indeed it is given in the report). The Flow of Funds Accounts (Bank of 
Japan) give comprehensive data on financial flows among the different sectors 
and  on  financial stocks in each  sector. Information on  the composition of 
household portfolios is valuable. 
For microeconomic data, the following four surveys from the Japanese gov- 138  Takatoshi  It0 and Yukinobu Kitamura 
Table 6.2  Concentration of Wealth 
1989 
Percentage of Wealth Owned by:  1979  1984  (0  (ii) 
Most wealthy 5 %  19  15  18  13 
Most wealthy 10%  37  29  36  27 
Most wealthy 25%  52  63  66  51 
Most wealthy 50%  84  85  86  74 
Source: NSFIE for 1979,  1984, and 1989. 
Note:  Figures for 1979, 1984, and 1989 (i) are financial wealth only. Figures for 1989 (ii) are total 
wealth, including real estate and durables. 
emment are the major ones. First, the Family Income and Expenditure Survey 
(FIES) aims at providing data on incomes and expenditures for all the nonagri- 
cultural households of two or more members and other related information. 
The FIES covers all consumer households in Japan except for those engaged 
in  agriculture, forestry, or  fishing,  and  except for one-person  households. 
About 8,000 households are randomly selected for the survey out of about 26 
million qualified households. 
The Family Saving Survey (FSS; Statistics Bureau, Management and Coor- 
dination Agency) gives information on  financial  savings and  liabilities of 
households, and their changes from the preceding year. The FSS tabulates the 
details of savings and liabilities with respect to various household characteris- 
tics, such as age cohort, income, number of  household members, and geo- 
graphic area. Stocks are evaluated at market value, and life insurance savings 
at the accumulated value of  premium payments. The survey samples about 
6,300 households, which have been sampled recently in the FIES. Since the 
sample households are a subsample of the FIES, single-member households 
and households in the business of agriculture, forestry, or fishing are excluded. 
A problem with this survey is that information on disposable income is not 
included so that the saving rate, in a conventional sense, cannot be calculated. 
The National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE; Statistics 
Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency) is the most comprehensive 
survey of consumer behavior. It covers single-member households, agriculture, 
forestry, and fishery households, as well as other types of households, and its 
sample size is as large as 59,000. Households are categorized by age and occu- 
pation of household head and by type of household (a couple only, a couple 
and a child, a parent and a child, etc.). With respect to consumer durables, the 
survey asks the date of purchase of the goods and whether they were bought 
as a replacement or as an addition. With the 1989 survey, information on real 
estate (land and house) ownership was added. 
The Comprehensive Survey of  Living Conditions of  the People on Health 
and Welfare (Ministry of Health and Welfare), begun in 1986, integrates four 
different surveys which had been conducted separately. One large survey, cov- 
ering about 240,000 households, is scheduled to be conducted every three 139  Public Policies and Household Saving in Japan 
years. Smaller-scale surveys are conducted during the other two years. The 
large survey asks questions in three categories:  households composition,  health 
conditions, and income and savings. Income and savings (financial assets and 
housing conditions) questions are cross-tabulated along different household 
types, such as households with an elderly member (65 years or older). Informa- 
tion on housing is not included in this survey. 
For a reference on the Japanese tax system written in English, the Tax Bu- 
reau, a branch of the Ministry of Finance, publishes an annual report on the 
Japanese tax system (An Outline of  Japanese Taxes) and on the data (the Na- 
tional Tax Ofice Yearbook).  Ishi (1989) is an authoritative survey of the Japa- 
nese tax system, and OECD (1991b) provides detailed information on personal 
and corporate tax systems in OECD-member countries. 
6.3  Tax Incentives for Household Asset Accumulations 
In Japan, tax incentives for household savings have gone through dramatic 
changes since the mid-1980s. Until April 1988, financial savings in the form 
of bank deposits and postal savings were essentially tax-exempt, and capital 
gains from stocks were also tax-exempt, provided the amounts were less than 
a certain limit that was considerably higher than the savings balance of  an 
average citizen. The Nakasone-Takeshita tax reform changed many  of  these 
tax exemptions for savings. Details of these incentives, before and after, will 
be explained below. 
6.3.1 
Maruyu Accounts 
A salient feature of the Japanese financial taxation system prior to 1988 was 
the  prevalence of  tax-exempt interest income from  what  were  commonly 
known as maruyu accounts, and by other similar names. Interest income from 
those accounts,  in which principal was beneath a ceiling and registered as such, 
were exempted from tax. Some kind of tax-exemption system for interest in- 
come can be traced back to 1920, but the modem system of  tax exemption 
started in 1963 and was effectively abolished in 1988. At the time of the 1988 
revision, interest income from the following assets, up to the specified princi- 
pal amount, was tax-exempt.* 
Interest income from a combined principal amount of up to 3 million yen, 
Tax-exempt Savings before April 1988 
2. Note that there had  been several revisions of  the maximum limits on tax-exempt savings. 
Limits for maruyu and yucho in 1963 were both 0.5 million yen and were both raised to  1 million 
yen in  1965. Special muruyu were introduced in  1968 with a limit of 0.5 million yen. In  1972, 
maruyu and yucho limits were raised to 1.5 million yen, while special maruyu limits were raised 
to 1 million yen. Also in 1972, zaikei were introduced with a limit of  1 million yen. In 1973, the 
zaikei limit was raised to 5 million yen and that for yucho to 3 million yen. In 1974, both maruyu 
and special maruyu limits were raised to 3 million yen. For  the definitions of  maruyu, yucho, 
special maruyu, and zaikei, see the text below. 140  Takatoshi Ito and Yukinobu Kitamura 
in the form of bank deposits, securities, or mutual funds was tax-exempt. Each 
account that qualified for tax exemption must have been registered as such, 
with a specified ceiling amount, at the local branch of the tax revenue office. 
The system was known as maruyu. The maruyu accounts could be bank depos- 
its, deposit accounts for employees within a company (shanai yokin), mutual 
trust funds (kinsen shintaku, kashitsuke shintaku) at trust banks, bonds (govern- 
ment bonds, municipal bonds, government guarantee bonds, corporate bonds, 
and yen-denominated bonds issues abroad, within five years of issuance), bank 
debentures (kinyu sai),  bond mutual funds, and stock mutual funds (with a ratio 
of stocks in portfolio under 70 percent). 
All interest income from postal savings (yucho)  was tax-exempt. The princi- 
pal  in a postal savings account could not exceed 3 million yen  per person. 
Hence, the ceiling for tax-exempt postal saving was 3 million yen. The most 
popular postal savings accounts were indefinite-maturity saving deposits (tei- 
gaku yokin),  in which interest compounds up to 10 years, with increasing inter- 
est rate schedules over the years. 
Government bonds and municipal bonds up to 3 million yen (face value), in 
addition to any bonds in maruyu accounts, could be registered as “special mar- 
uyu” accounts and yield tax-exempt interest income. 
Interest income from housing (jutaku)  zaikei accounts and pension (nenkin) 
zaikei accounts was tax free.3  To qualify for tax exemption, the account holder 
had to be an employee under age 54, and monthly installments (deposits) had 
to be withheld at source and automatically transferred to the account at a fi- 
nancial institution. Zuikei accounts could be held as savings-type life insur- 
ance, as well as time deposits and other types of deposits in banks, mutual trust 
funds, and bonds. They had  to be accumulated for more than 3 years, and 
pension zaikei accounts for 5 years. The combined principal of zaikei accounts 
could be up to 5 million yen. Housing zaikei accounts could be withdrawn only 
to purchase or improve housing (land, structure, or renovation), and pension 
zaikei could be withdrawn only after the saver reached age 55. The saver of 
these accounts also had access to preferential (housing) loans. 
In addition to these accounts, postal installment savings (juutaku tsumitate 
postal savings) earmarked for housing, up to 500,000 yen, were tax-exempt. 
Interest income from savings for tax payment (tax payment preparation ac- 
counts) was also tax-exempt, as long as it was used for the said purpose. 
In  sum, the maximum amount of  principal which could yield tax-exempt 
interest income (excluding the tax payment preparation account) can be tabu- 
lated as follows: 
Bank deposits, bonds, and mutual funds 
(maruyu)  3 million yen 
3. Zuikei,  an  abbreviation  for  kinrosha  zuisan-keisei  chochiku,  literally  means  employee 
property-formation savings. 141  Public Policies and  Household Saving in Japan 
Postal savings (  yucho) 
Government and municipal bonds (spe- 
Housing and pension savings (zaikei) 
Earmarked savings for housing purchases 
3 million yen 
cia1 maruyu)  3 million yen 
5 million yen 
(postal zaikei)  0.5 million yen 
Total  14.5 million yen 
All together, each individual in Japan was eligible for tax exemption on interest 
from savings of up to 14.5 million yen, which was far above average household 
savings. Moreover, a family of four could take advantage of four times of this 
limit using different family members’ names for accounts and, if all were em- 
ployees, qualifying for zaikei. Such use of different names did not prompt gift 
taxation. (Note that nonemployees could not  take  advantage of  zaikei ac- 
counts.) 
The Bank of Japan estimated that from 1973 to 1988, on average, 54.9 per- 
cent of household savings qualified for tax exemption. Table 6.3 shows that in 
1988, assets of nearly 300 trillion yen, equal to half of all household savings, 
were tax-exempt. Since the maximum amount of exempt savings (14.5 million 
yen) far exceeded average household savings (6.8 million yen  for all house- 
holds in  1984), in practice, the interest earned on virtually all savings held by 
average (middle-income) savers was tax-exempt. Moreover, it was suspected 
that many wealthy savers evaded taxation by circumventing the limits on prin- 
cipal in tax-exempt accounts. Since there was no system of individual identifi- 
cation numbers (such as Social Security numbers in United States), it was rela- 
tively easy to open several accounts in different regions, each account under 
the limit, without being detected by  the tax a~thority.~  During the period be- 
tween July 1985 and June 1986, the Tax Bureau estimated that over 12 trillion 
yen of household savings, held mainly by large-lot savers, were evading taxa- 
tion by  being kept accounts opened using fictitious names or the names of 
different family members (Nihon Keizai Shinbun  [daily], October 5, 1986). 
The Tax Bureau took the view that the actual magnitude of tax evasion might 
have been larger than this estimate because the bureau did not examine postal 
savings, which comprised one-third of tax-exempt savings. 
Individual utilization of  tax incentives in the system of  tax  exemption is 
estimated in table 6.4. The results show that maruyu were the most popular 
form of tax-exempt accounts and that yucho (postal savings) came next. Spe- 
cial maruyu and zaikei were used by only a very small fraction. This was partly 
because exemptions for these accounts required certain application proce- 
dures, while maruyu and yucho qualified for exemption quite easily. 
4. It was widely speculated that bank deposits and postal savings with false (phantom) names- 
names of those who had no assets-were  not detected. Moreover, accounts opened by the same 
person but in different regions, i.e., tax districts, each account under the ceiling amount, tended to 
evade detection, because no national LD. number for savers was used. 142  Takatoshi Ito and Yukinobu Kitamura 
Table 6.3  Share of Tax-exempt  Savings in Total Household Savings 
Share of Tax-exempt 
Tax-exempt Savings  Savings in Total 



















































Source: Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics Annual (Tokyo, 1988) 
Table 6.4  Utilization Ratios for Tax-exempt Accounts in Household 
Savings (%) 

















































































Source: Bank  of  Japan database. 
Note:  Utilization ratio is calculated by actual amounts divided by legally eligible amounts. 143  Public Policies and Household Saving in Japan 
Taxation on Dividends and Capital Gains from Stocks 
Capital gains from stocks were tax-exempt prior to  1988. Small-lot divi- 
dends, that is less than 50,000 yen per semiannual payment, or 100,000 yen 
per annual payment, were taxed at 20 percent at source, separately from in- 
come from other sources (such as wages and salaries). For large-lot dividends 
(those other than small-lot dividends), the stockholder could elect either (1) to 
be subject to 20 percent withholding tax and later be taxed as a part of total 
taxable income for income taxation or (2) to be subject to 35 percent separate 
taxation at the time of dividend payment (“separate” means that the dividend 
is not to be aggregated with income from other sources for the purpose of 
income ta~ation).~ 
Taxation on Savings Other than Maruyu 
Interest income from accounts other than maruyu were subject to taxation. 
Ordinary deposits, typically demand deposits in Japan, were subject to 20 per- 
cent separate taxation. For interest income from time deposits, mutual trust 
funds, and bonds and dividends from mutual funds, the saver could elect either 
(1) to be subject to 20 percent withholding tax and later be taxed as a part of 
total taxable income for income taxation or (2) to be subject to 35 percent 
separate taxation at the time of dividend payment, but not subject to income 
taxation. Discount income from discount bonds was  taxed  separately at  16 
percent. 
Income Deduction for Insurance Premium Payments 
Some parts of premiums for social insurance, life insurance, and individual 
pension-type insurance could be income tax-deductible.  Details will be ex- 
plained in section 6.3.2. 
“Green  Card” Fiasco 
As a part of tax reform intended to enhance revenues, the government pro- 
posed the introduction of value-added tax, called sales tax, in December 1978. 
However, public criticism mounted and demanded the closing of  loopholes, 
including tax evasion using maruyu accounts and other provisions for interest 
income tax exemption. After intense debate, it was decided in the tax reform 
of  1980 that a “green card” would be introduced in January 1984 to identify 
all small-lot savers. According to the plan, one green card per person would 
be issued to prevent false accounts and other misuses of the system. 
Strong opposition to green cards arose in 1981 and  1982 and resulted in 
the deferral of their introduction-originally  scheduled for January 1984-to 
1987. Then in 1985, the green card plan was abandoned altogether. 
5. Those subject to a marginal income tax rate over 35 percent would elect to have dividends 
taxed at 35 percent separation taxation at source. 144  Takatoshi Ito and Yukinobu Kitamura 
Table 6.5  Summary of the Statutory AveragelTop Tax Rates 
1980  1985  1990  1992 
Interest (non-maruyu)  20.0/35.0  20.0/35.0  20.0/20.0  20.0/20.0 
Dividends  35.0135.0  35.0135.0  20.0/35  .O  20.0/35.0 
Capital gains from stocks  o.o/o.o  o.o/o.o  20.0/26.0  20.0/26.0 
Source: Tax Bureau (various issues, b). 
Interest income would be taxed via “separate taxation” (separate from in- 
come from other sources).  In the process of the Nakasone-Takeshita  tax reform 
(1988/89), not necessarily to combat large-scale tax evasion, but more funda- 
mentally to achieve consistency and equality in the tax  system, the system 
of  tax exemption of  interest income from household savings was effectively 
(although not completely) abolished in April 1988. The new  system is a flat 
20  percent  tax-withheld  at  source, separately  from  income  from  other 
sources-on  all interest income. A historical summary of the system of capital 
income taxation, including tax rates on dividends and capital gains, is given in 
table 6.5. 
6.3.2  Taxation on Financial Savings in 1992 
Many types of  capital income in Japan are separately taxed-that  is, not 
combined with other types of income, such as wages and salaries, and taxed at 
a flat rate at source, collected at the time of payment. This is withholding, but 
when taxes are filed on other income, capital income and taxes withheld at 
source are not reported (i.e., after collection of the 20 percent tax, individual 
names and other information are not reported by banks to the tax authority, and 
individuals are not asked about interest income at the time of tax filing). In the 
following, “taxed separately”  should be interpreted as this practice. The system 
of capital income taxation now in effect (i.e., as of April 1, 1988) can be sum- 
marized as follows. 
Interest Income 
Interest income is taxed separately, at a flat 20 percent (15 percent national 
tax and 5 percent local tax). Note that this is still an incentive to save for those 
who are in a higher income-tax bracket (higher than 20 percent). In addition, 
some maruyu (tax-exempt savings) remain for the elderly (age 65 and over), 
widows (and widowers), the handicapped, and working students in special pro- 
grams: these allow 3 million yen in bank deposits, securities, and mutual funds; 
another 3 million yen in postal savings; and 3 million yen in government and 
municipal bonds. Finally, there exist other tax-exempt financial instruments, 
available to all, including “employee’s housing-formation saving account” (ju- 
taku zaikei) and “employee’s pension endowment-formation saving account” 
(nenkin zaikei). Interest income for these accounts is tax-exempt, up to a capi- 
tal limit of 5 million yen total. 145  Public Policies and Household Saving in Japan 
Dividends 
The tax system for dividends to resident individuals varies with the size of 
the dividend: 
Less than 50,000 yen.  If  the size of a semiannual dividend from holdings in 
one company is less than 50,000 yen (or an annual dividend of 100,000 yen), 
then a flat 20 percent tax is imposed, taxed separately at source (just as for 
interest income). This rule applies to holdings in each company. No individual 
tax filing is necessary, and no local “inhabitants” tax is imposed.6 
Between 50,000 and 250,000 yen.  If the size of a semiannual dividend from 
holdings in one company is more than 50,000 yen but less than 250,000 yen 
(or an annual dividend of 500,000 yen), then a taxpayer may elect one of the 
following: 
1. A 35 percent tax, separately taxed at source. However, local inhabitants 
tax must be paid on total income (the aggregate of dividends and other income); 
2. A 20 percent withholding tax, plus tax on total income at the time of tax 
filing. There is income deduction for dividend income when it is elected as tax 
filing with combined (total) income. At the time of tax filing, tax credit will be 
given. The tax credit is 10 percent of dividends for those with taxable income 
of  10 million yen or less, or 5 percent of dividends for the amount exceeding 
10 million yen.’  Local inhabitant’s tax is also imposed. 
More than 250,000 yen.  If the size of a semiannual dividend from holdings in 
one company is more than 250,000 yen (or an annual dividend of 500,000 yen 
from one company), or if the dividend is from stock that constitutes more than 
5 percent of issued stocks, then option (2),  described for dividends between 
50,000 and 250,000 yen, should be applied. Local inhabitant’s tax is also im- 
posed. 
Note that  an individual in a higher tax  bracket will have an incentive to 
diversify his portfolio so that each dividend payment from any one company is 
less than 50,000 yen and so can avoid being reported at the time of tax filing. 
Also, dividend rates are much lower in Japan. The dividendprice ratio is about 
1 percent. Therefore, in order to earn 100,000 yen as dividends, 10 million yen 
must be invested in one company. Finally, dividends in securities income trusts 
are taxed at 20 percent (15 percent national income tax and 5 percent inhabit- 
ant’s tax), separately. 
6. Inhabitant’s tax is part of local (prefecture and municipal) tax. Local tax includes property 
tax, special land-holding tax, and real property acquisition tax, among others. 
7. The personal and corporate income tax systems are not fully integrated. A partial shareholder 
relief scheme exists-that  is, if income other than dividends is less than 10 million yen, but com- 
bined income of dividends and other income exceeds 10 million yen, then the 10 percent tax credit 
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Capital Gains  from Stocks 
A  taxpayer may  elect one of  the following treatments for capital gains 
from stocks: 
1. Tax equals 1  percent of sales value (that is 20 percent capital gains tax on 
deemed capital gains of  5 percent), applicable to listed and over-the-counter 
stocks, separately taxed at the time of sales. No reporting at the time of tax 
filing is required. 
2.  Income tax of 20 percent and local inhabitant’s tax of 6 percent on capital 
gains from all stock sales. If  this option is elected, it is payable at the time of 
tax filing, but separately from taxes on other types of income. 
Note that if capital losses are realized, option (2) should be chosen. Moreover, 
gains may be canceled against the loss. These options can be switched at any 
time during the year. 
Real Estate Capital Gains 
Capital gains from real estate will be treated separately in section 6.3.3. 
Social Security Pensions 
The social security pension program can be regarded as forced savings by 
the government for individuals. From a theoretical point of view (the life-cycle 
model to be explained later), there is no difference between social security 
benefits and individual savings toward retirement. With respect to social secu- 
rity, the following tax treatment is applicable: 
1. Social security contributions (health insurance and others) are fully de- 
ductible from income. 
2. Social security benefits (pension income) have  special deductions: (i) a 
lump sum deduction of 1 million yen for persons age 65 and over (or 0.5 mil- 
lion yen for persons under age 65) is applied; (ii) after the l million yen deduc- 
tion, the following deduction is applied: 25 percent of the first 3.6 million yen, 
15 percent of  the portion from 3.6 to 7.2 million yen, and 5 percent of  the 
portion beyond 7.2 million yen (minimum guaranteed amount from deductions 
(i) and (ii) is 1.4 million yen); (iii) on top of  these deductions, the elderly 
deduction of 500,000 is applicable.* 
3. A special type of individual retirement (pension) account, called kokumin 
nenkin kikin, was introduced in April 1991 and became available only for non- 
employees (between the ages of 20 and 59) and wives of nonemployees. Inter- 
8. Before the September 1987 reform, social security benefits (pension income) were regarded 
as part of salary, and standard deductions for salaries were applicable. To  replace these standard 
deductions, the new deductions illustrated in (2) were introduced. Combining these deductions 
with other basic deductions (350,000  yen), the spouse deduction (350,000 yen), and the special 
spouse deduction (350,000  yen), an elderly pension-income earner with a spouse, receiving pen- 
sion income of less than 4.5 million yen, is not taxed. Considering the current level of  benefits, 
most pension earners (with no additional source of income) are not taxed (for details, see Takay- 
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est income from this pension account is tax-exempt, and its contribution, up to 
68,000 yen per month per person, is tax-deductible. 
Retirement (Severance)  Pay 
It has been the custom that a Japanese corporation  pays lump sum retirement 
severance pay, which amounts to three to five times annual salary at the time 
of retirement. The steep age-earning profile of Japanese workers, coupled with 
the practice of lifetime employment, makes this a sizable income (see Ito 1992, 
chap. 8). Lump sum severance pay  can be regarded as a deferred payment 
of  salary, or as forced saving by  a corporation for a worker. Given the steep 
progressivity of the Japanese income tax, retirement pay would be taxed heav- 
ily at the payment of  a retirement lump sum. Thus, special deductions and 
separate taxation apply to severance pay: (i) Deduct the lump sum (400,000 
yen times the number of years worked for the company [up to 20 years] plus 
700,000 yen times the number of years worked for the company exceeding 20 
years). (ii) After deduction (i), divide the remaining amount in half. Apply the 
income tax table to this amount. This is taxed separately from other types of 
income. such as salaries. 
Life Insurance 
Some types of life insurance are also a form of  savings-in  Japan, savings- 
type life insurance, such as universal insurance, is more popular than term 
insurance. In particular, single-premium life insurance, which is essentially a 
saving instrument with tax advantage, became popular in the 1980s. 
Before the 1988 tax reform, single-premium  endowment (life) insurance en- 
joyed the following tax benefits: 
1. Life insurance premium payments of more than 100,000 yen entitled the 
payer to a 50,000 yen deduction from (combined) in~ome.~ 
2. Life insurance repayment at the maturity of  the contract is considered 
occasional income (ichiji  shotoku),  which has a 500,000 yen lump sum deduct- 
ible, and the amount after the lump sum deduction is halved and combined 
with other income. Note, however, that an employee whose other income is 
less than 200,000 yen did not have to file taxes. Considering  this tax advantage, 
coupled with high dividends and with regulated bank deposit interest rates, 
many  consumers shifted savings from bank deposits to single-premium life 
insurance policies in the 1980s. This prompted the following change. After the 
1988 tax reform, (1) is still valid, and (2) is only applicable to life insurance 
premiums on a contract exceeding 5 years. For single-premium insurance poli- 
cies with 5 years or less of maturity, the dividends are taxed at 20 percent, just 
like interest income. 
9. Life insurance premiums up  to 25,000 yen  are fully deductible, half  the amount between 
25,000 and 50,000 yen is deductible, and one-fourth of the amount between 50,OOO and 100,000 
yen is deductible. The maximum deduction of 50,000 yen is reached at a premium payment of 
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3. Individual “pension” insurance policy premiums can be deducted from 
4.  Non-life  insurance (such as fire insurance) premium payments are de- 
income, up to 50,000 yen per annum.’O 
ductible, to a maximum of  15,000 yen.” 
6.3.3  Housing-related Tax Treatment 
As will be explained later, housing is one of the most important investment 
(or saving) decisions of one’s life. There are special provisions related to land 
and structures for housing. 
Tax Credit for a Home Owner 
A portion of a mortgage can be applied as a tax credit for six years according 
to the schedule below, provided the following requirements are met: (i) hous- 
ing is newly acquired and is inhabited by the owner within six months of pur- 
chase, (ii) housing has floor  space of  220 square meters or  less, (iii) home 
owner’s annual income does not exceed 20 million yen, (iv) a special treatment 
in the carry-over of capital gains is not taken. The tax credit = (a) { 1 percent 
of  the mortgage balance at the end of  year, up to 20 million yen}  + (b) (0.5 
percent of the mortgage balance between 20 million and 30 million yen}. 
Requirement (ii) was added in 1991. The income limit in requirement (iii) 
was lowered from 30 million yen  to 20 million yen in 1991, in exchange for 
the change in additional tax credit, part (b). The time limit of tax credit applica- 
bility was extended from 5 to 6 years in 1990. In 1986 and 1987, in the calcula- 
tion of tax credit, part (a), the balance of  a public (subsidized) mortgage was 
halved. 
The ways  in which owner-occupied housing is encouraged in the United 
States and in Japan are different. In the United States, the mortgage interest 
payment isflllly deductiblefrom income, as long as itemized deduction is cho- 
sen (this provision has been in place for a long time). In Japan, a similar tax 
incentive is provided through a tax credit, for only six years. This tax credit 
10. The schedule of deductions for individual pension insurance premiums is the same that for 
single-premium insurance policies explained in item (1) and n. 9. 
11. hemium payments on a non-life  insurance policy with more than ten-year maturity and 
with end-of-contract dividends are deductible according to the following schedule: (i) if premium 
is  10,000 yen, fully deductible, (ii) for premium payments between  10,000 and 20,000 yen, the 
deductible amount is 5,000 yen plus half of premium payments, and (iii) for premium payments 
of more than 20,000 yen, the deductible amount is 15,000 yen. Premium payments on a non-life 
insurance policy with less-than-ten-year maturity are deductible according to the following sched- 
ule: (i) if premium payments are less than 2,000 yen, fully deductible, (ii) for premium payments 
between 2,000 and 4,000 yen, the deductible amount is 1,000 yen plus half of premium payments, 
and (iii) for premium payments of more than 4,000 yen, the deductible amount is 3,000 yen. Long- 
term and short-term policy premium payments can be combined to reach a deductible amount but 
such a deduction cannot exceed 15,000 yen. 
Saving-type non-life  insurance with maturity repayment is classified as saving (not as consump- 
tion). However, saving-type insurance usually contains a portion that is never paid back, which 
must be considered consumption. In this sense, official statistics have overestimated savings in the 
form of non-life  insurance, although the total amount of overestimation must be very small. 149  Public Policies and Household Saving in Japan 
schedule was introduced in  1986, and the details of this provision have been 
changing almost every year, as explained in the preceding paragraph. Before 
1986, limited tax deductibility was available. 
Capital Gains on Land and Housing Structures 
five years and “short-term” gains on assets held under five years:Iz 
Capital gains are divided into “long-term” gains on assets held more than 
Basic rule  for long-term capital gains on land and housing. Capital gains after 
deduction are taxed, separately from other income, at 39 percent (i.e., 30 per- 
cent national tax and 9 percent local tax). 
Basic rule for short-term capital gains on land and housing. Of the following, 
apply whichever leads to the larger tax: (1) capital gains after deduction are 
taxed, separately from other income, at 52 percent (i.e., 40 percent national tax 
and  12 percent local tax); (2) capital gains that are combined and taxed ac- 
cording to the income tax schedule are taxed at 110 percent of additional in- 
come tax. 
Special rule for capital gains on owner-occupied housing in which an owner 
has lived for more than ten years.  Capital gains after a 30 million yen deduc- 
tion are taxed at 14 percent (10 percent national and 4 percent local) for the 
first 60 million yen, and at 20 percent (15 percent national and 5 percent local) 
thereafter. Note that this special rule does not apply to capital gains carried 
over due to the home replacement provision listed below. 
Deductions on capital gains on land and housing applicable  to basic rule. 
(i) owner-occupied housing-30  million yen (this provision cannot be invoked 
again for three years), (ii) forced sale to the government for public purposes- 
50 million yen, (5)  forced sale for city planning-20  million yen, (iv) forced 
sale for housing development project-  15 million yen. 
Carry-over of  capital gains.  Because of the different needs associated with 
different stages of the life cycle, people tend to change housing. If capital gains 
can be carried over for life, this switch can be done smoothly. In fact, such a 
carry-over was created in 1952 and abolished in  1970; it was then revived in 
I972 for long-term (more than ten-year) owner-occupied housing, but again 
12. The definition of “long-term” housing is housing that has been owned for more than five 
years, on January 1 of the year in which the sale is made. Hence, a holding period of almost six 
years is required if the sale is made on December 3 1. 
Separate taxation was introduced in 1969. The tax rate on long-term gains has been increased 
in recent years. It was 14  percent in 1970 and 1971, and it was 26 percent (on gains up to 40 million 
yen) and 32.5 percent (on gains exceeding 40  million yen) as recently as 1991. The definitions of 
“long-term” and “short-term” were changed in 1987, with the holding period changed from ten to 
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abolished in 1985, when it was replaced by a very special rule: If a long-term 
(more than  ten-year) owner-occupied house had been  obtained by  bequest 
from parents or grandparents and the current owner has lived in the same house 
for more than thirty years (presumably with parents or grandparents), then cap- 
ital gains can be carried forward to the next house. 
Land and housing when bequeathed is assessed at less than market value: 
this will be explained later. 
Parents can help a child buy a house through a special provision in the gift 
tax: if the cash is used to purchase a house, parents can give an outright cash 
gift of 3 million yen to a child tax-free, and cash gifts between 3 and 5 million 
yen are taxed lightly. 
Property Tax 
This tax is imposed on owners of land, buildings, and tangible assets that 
are depreciable in individual and corporate income taxes (i.e., plant and ma- 
chinery). The assessment of land and buildings is made every three years, and 
that of tangible business assets every year. Substantial underassessment, with 
regional variations, is more the general rule than the exception. Real property 
below a certain assessed value for each type of asset is tax-exempt. The stan- 
dard tax rate is 1.4 percent, and the maximum rate is 2.1 percent. 
It should be noted that there are many types of income which are sources of 
savings. Apart from labor, interest, and dividend income, there are retirement, 
timber,  occasional,  and  miscellaneous  income  with  separate  deductible 
amounts. Japanese workers receive a sizable retirement severance payment. If 
it were subject to the usual income tax scheme, the typical retirement severance 
payment would put a worker in the top bracket of  the progressive schedule. 
Hence, there is a special deduction for retirement income. Occasional income 
is formally defined as income deemed to be temporary and particular to one 
year; this may be considered a substitute for income averaging. Miscellaneous 
income includes all other types of income, such as honoraria. Household sav- 
ing behavior is, in one way  or another, bound by  all these tax treatments. It 
should be noted, however, that interest payments for consumer loans are not 
tax deductible. The Nakasone-Takeshita tax reform reduced the progressivity 
and the level of total income tax rates at all levels of government, although the 
absolute levels are still high, compared with some other G5 countries. Figure 
6.3 illustrates this dramatic change between 1986 and 1992. 
6.3.4 
Mervyn King made an ingenious attempt to combine various tax rules into 
an index of  effective marginal personal tax rates (this became known as the 
King-Fullerton method; for details, see King and Fullerton [  19841). Recently 
the OECD (1991a, 1991b) conducted an international comparison of capital 
income taxation for OECD countries employing the King-Fullerton method. 
The relevant results from the project are reported in table 6.6. The effect of the 
Nakasone-Takeshita  tax reform does not show up clearly in the figures for 1985 
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Source: Tax Bureau (various issues, b). 
Nore: Tax rates are combined at all levels of government (i.e., national, prefecture, and municipal). 
Statutory rates of personal income taxes, 1986-92 
and 1990. There are two explanations for this. First, as table 6.5 showed, under 
the reform average personal tax rates on interest remain the same, while aver- 
age tax rates on dividends and capital gains move in opposite directions. On 
balance, the effective marginal personal tax rate remains at more or less the 
same level. Second, for the sake of comparison, the King-Fullerton method is 152  Takatoshi Ito and Yukinobu Kitamura 
Table 6.6  Effective Marginal Personal Tax Rates on Capital Income (%) 
1980  1985  1990 
United States  -  38.4  66.7 
Japan  56.1  23.6  28.3 
Germany  70.3  42.9  46.9 
France  -  45.3  25.4 
United Kingdom  -  67.8  63.2 
~~~  ~~  ~  ~ 
Source: OECD (1991a). 
Note:  The King-Fullerton method is used with some modifications, using countryspecific interest 
rates, inflation rates, and average personal tax rate. 
based on hypothetical projections that do not necessarily capture reality. As 
reported earlier, average household savings were effectively tax-exempt before 
1988, while, since 1988, a flat 20 percent withholding tax has been imposed 
on interest. Thus a calculation based on hypothetical projections using statu- 
tory tax rates might lead to a misleading conclusion. In fact, it is quite likely 
that effective marginal tax rates on capital income before 1988 were much 
lower than the figures in table 6.6 (see Shoven and Tachibanaki [I9881 for 
similar results in the earlier period). 
A drawback is that the above results are based only on domestic manufactur- 
ing investment. Without considering international portfolio investment, spill- 
over effects of  capital income taxation on international investors can not be 
fully captured. In terms of personal taxes, however, most household savings 
are liable to domestic personal taxation. In any case, during the period from 
1980 to 1990, effective marginal personal tax rates on capital income in Japan 
were relatively low, compared with the other G5 countries. It is, however, an 
open question whether the high household saving rates in Japan can be ex- 
plained, at least in part, by  the low effective marginal personal tax rate on 
savings. 
6.4  Asset Allocation 
In this section, historical changes in portfolio selection are reviewed. An 
important question to ask is, What makes portfolio selection change over time? 
Possible reasons for portfolio shifts are: (i) a shift in real rates of return during 
the stock market boom in the 1980s, (ii) financial market liberalization (the 
introduction of  new  financial assets), (iii) tax reform (imposing 20 percent 
withholding tax on interest and dividends), and (iv) fiscal deficits (government 
bond issues). 
Several characteristics of Japanese households can be identified from figure 
6.4 and table 6.7. First, judging from figure 6.4, the Japanese are very risk- 
averse, in the sense that about 60 percent of the household portfolio is held in 
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Fig. 6.4  Composition of household portfolio, 1964-90 
Source: Bank of Japan, Flow of  Funds Accounts (Tokyo, various issues). 
Note: T DEP =  time deposits; STOCK = stock; INSUR = life insurance; SECUR = securities 
(mainly government and corporate bonds); MONEY =  demand deposits and currencies. 
considered to be  in table 6.7. Horioka (1990, 56) estimates that during the 
period from 1964 to 1984, the average annual rate of after-tax returns (includ- 
ing capital gains and dividends) on stockholdings in listed corporations was 
about 17 percent, whereas the average annual deposit rate was about 5 percent. 
The high degree of risk aversion among Japanese households may have con- 
tributed not only to skewing portfolio allocation toward safe assets but also to 
raising the overall level of household savings. In addition, public opinion sur- 
veys find that preparation for unforeseen emergencies is by far the dominant 
motive for saving in Japan. This implies that the level of precautionary savings 
must be high and that such savings must be held in safe assets. 
Second, cash holdings, including demand deposits declined constantly over 
the 1964-90 period. This is partly because transactions between bank accounts 
Table 6.7  Correlation Matrix 
Currency  Time Deposits  Insurance  Government Bonds  Stocks 
Currency  1  0.13045  -0.76194  -0.73679  -0.36221 
Time deposits  0.13045  1  -  0.52664  0.4  8  6  6  3  -0.9 1974 
Insurance  -0.76194  -0.52664  1  0.20479  0.52276 
Government bonds  -0.73679  0.48663  0.20479  1  -0.18827 
Stocks  -0.36221  -0.91974  0.52276  -0.18827  1 
Source: Bank of Japan, Flow of Funds Accounts (Tokyo, 1964-1990). 154  Takatoshi It0 and Yukinobu Kitamura 
(current and deposits) became easier and cheaper and partly because credit 
cards became more widely used. 
Third, the shares of  life insurance (especially single-premium life insur- 
ance), stocks, and investment trusts have  increased since 1982, particularly 
since 1985. This reflects the stock market boom during the 1982-1988  period. 
Japanese households might have  increased their sensitivity to the “after-tax 
rate of  return.” Further investigations are required, at least.  on the following 
points: (1) because of the boom in the land and stock markets, Japanese house- 
holds in general might have become wealthier and less risk-averse; (2)  as the 
income and wealth distribution  becomes more unequal, richer (usually older)I3 
households hold risky assets, whereas poorer (usually younger) households 
keep their portfolios in relatively safe assets; and (3) the average household 
does not take the direct risk of holding stocks but goes through institutional 
investments, such as life insurance and investment trusts, to enjoy higher after- 
tax rates of return from savings (table 6.7 shows that households seem to con- 
sider insurance a risk-bearing investment). 
Fourth, the share of  government bonds (securities) has declined as new is- 
sues of government bonds became smaller during the process of reducing fiscal 
deficits in the 1980s. 
The above observations indicate that changes in  portfolio selection hap- 
pened well before the Nakasone-Takeshita tax reform, and chiefly because of 
the stock market boom in the 1980s. But to identify how sensitive Japanese 
households are to tax incentives or “after-tax” interest rates, we have to use a 
microdata source, containing microeconomic characteristics and information 
on portfolio selection by the elderly and isolating tax factors from macroeco- 
nomic factors. This task will be taken up in future research. 
6.5  Role of Intergenerational Transfers 
6.5.1  Life-cycle Hypothesis and the Japanese Experience 
In order to examine the effects of tax incentives on savings, we cannot ig- 
nore other factors that determine savings in society. The life-cycle hypothesis 
of  saving and  consumption is one of  the most accepted principles in eco- 
nomics. 
Although the budget constraint on individuals implies that they  will save 
nothing over a lifetime, aggregate savings in a growing society will be positive. 
This is a basic observation of the life-cycle hypothesis. Japan, indeed, has ex- 
13. Takayama and Arita (1992), using the 1989 NSFIE, report that rich elderly households hold 
a  substantially  higher proportion  of risky  assets than average households.  See also Takayama 
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Source: Horioka (1991). 
Nore: AGE = ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the population aged 20-64;  DEP = ratio of 
the population aged 19 and  under to the population aged 20-64. 
perienced relatively rapid economic growth, accompanied by  a high saving 
rate. This is supporting evidence for the life-cycle hypothesis. Could the life- 
cycle hypothesis be a dominant force? This is an important question because 
we have to evaluate how tax incentives work through saving decisions in the 
life-cycle framework (see Ito 1992, chap. 9, esp. 275-77). 
At first glance, the Japanese experience is a strong case for the life-cycle 
hypothesis. The personal saving rate increased as the economic growth rate 
increased in postwar Japan, until both peaked around the first oil crisis of 
1973-74  (see fig. 6.2). The correlation is strikingly high. 
Suppose that life-cycle saving is a dominant force in Japan, then the rapid 
aging of Japanese society will have a profound implication for the saving rate. 
Currently, about 15 percent of the Japanese population is elderly (over age 6S), 
and by  the year 2015, the population share of  the elderly will double (i.e., to 
about 30 percent, see fig. 6.5). As the population weight of the elderly-typi- 
cal dissavers-rises,  the saving rate will decline (see also Takayama  1992, 
fig. 2.3). 
One test of the life-cycle hypothesis is an experiment of introducing (pay- 
as-you-go) social security pensions. The pension funds operated by the govem- 
ment enable people to save less from disposable income (net of pension fund 
contributions), so the personal saving rate should drop. The social security 156  Takatoshi Ito and Yukinobu Kitamura 
reform in the beginning of  the  1970s in Japan came close to such a social 
experiment. However, there was no obvious drop in the personal saving rate 
among the generation who  would benefit most  from the  reform  (this was 
pointed out by Hayashi [  19861). 
The validity  of  the (pure) life-cycle hypothesis is challenged on  several 
grounds. First, if  the elderly have a bequest motive, either purely altruistic or 
strategic, then they may not dissave even after retirement. That is, the aging of 
a society will not reduce the personal saving rate if  the elderly do not spend 
down their life savings but instead hand down assets to their children, either 
through bequests or outright gifts. Second, if, for the elderly, personal savings 
are intended to build up enough wealth for contingencies-such  as poor health 
and other unexpected expenses-during  the retirement years, the introduction 
(the deterioration) of a social security health program would lower (raise) the 
saving rate. 
6.5.2  Dissaving or Bequest 
It is difficult to quantify how much the elderly save out of their labor and 
pension income, or dissave from their wealth. There are two kinds of measure- 
ment problems. First, when household surveys classify statistics by  age, all 
surveys classify them by the age of the household head. In Japan, many elderly 
people live with their children. In such a “merged” family, the household head 
is usually defined to be the person who earns the most-that  is, is most likely 
to be the elderly person’s child, at the peak of life-cycle earning power. There- 
fore, statistics about the elderly contain a sample selection bias. A typical sur- 
vey of this type is the FSS (see Ito 1992, table 9.2,265). 
One solution of the merged family problem is to look at a survey with age 
information on family members in the same household. Hayashi, Ando, and 
Ferris (1988) used the NSFIE to obtain such information, and estimated the 
degree of  dissaving by  the elderly. Their study attempts to extract as much 
information as possible on the behavior of  older persons living with younger 
families, although it is not free from the data control problem. They find that, 
in the case of dependent older families (consisting of  members of  extended 
families),  savings  are  somewhat larger than  the  savings of  corresponding 
young nuclear families and that their total net worth increases less than the 
net worth of corresponding young nuclear families. These patterns are strong 
evidence that wealth is being transferred within extended families, and they 
are also consistent with the possibility that there may be additional intergenera- 
tional transfers from dependent old families to young nuclear families. 
Another way to look at the question of whether the elderly dissave or not is 
to try measuring bequests directly. According to Barthold and Ito (1992), who 
use bequest tax filing information, about one-third to one-half of  household 
assets are obtained by  bequests in Japan, and the ratio is comparable for the 
United States. This is a significant proportion and supports the idea that the 
elderly do not dissave enough and leave sizable bequests, intended or not (see 
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Fig. 6.6  Intergenerational  transfers (nominal values), 1953-89 
Source: Tax Bureau, Annual Statistics (Tokyo, 1953-89). 
6.5.3  How Tax Incentives Would Work 
The most expensive purchase over the life cycle is usually housing. The 
treatment of housing was already touched upon in section 6.3.3. We will elabo- 
rate on this aspect from the particular viewpoint of life-cycle saving. 
According to the pure life-cycle model (i.e., without the bequest motive), 
owner-occupied housing must be sold well in advance of death. Enough cash 
flow will be generated from home equity for lifetime financial support, and 
can be spent after moving into rental housing. However, in the statistics, there 
is no significant drop in the home-ownership rate after age 65.14 There are three 
obvious reasons that elderly people are unwilling to sell their homes. 
First, the quality of rental housing is quite low in Japan. House-lease law 
favors tenants, so that it is almost impossible to terminate a contract, even at 
its nominal end, without a tenant’s consent. Hence, most rental housing is small 
and of low to medium quality, so that tenants will not stay forever (see Ito 
1992,423). 
Second, high transactions costs coupled with a heavy capital gains tax (a flat 
30 percent for nonfinancial assets) are disincentives for relocation. Even if the 
14. The home-ownership rate of  a cohort is defined as the ratio of the number of households 
with owner-occupied housing to the total number of households for a given cohort (age bracket). 
See, e.g., the Ministry of  Construction, Housing Survey, for the aggregate statistics, cited in Ito 
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elderly prefer to live in housing more suitable to their stage in the life cycle, 
selling a house is a losing proposition in terms of one’s portfolio. 
Third, in the bequest tax code,15 real estate is lightly assessed, as discussed 
in section 6.3.3.  For example, the assessed value of land for bequest taxation 
(rosen ka) is at most 70 percent of  the official survey price (koji kukuku), 
which, in turn,  is about 70 percent of the market price. Hence, it is well known 
that assessed value is about 30-50  percent of market value. In addition, land 
up to 200 square meters (part of a large lot or an aggregate of smaller lots) is 
valued at 50 to 60 percent of  rosen ka. In addition, the mortgage liability of 
the same asset is fully deductible from its taxable value. It does not take much 
calculation for an elderly person with bequest motive to figure out a scheme to 
lessen bequest (inheritance) tax liability: buy a house (or apartment building 
to become a landlord) and carry debt. This is exactly what happens among the 
Japanese elderly. About 60 percent of bequeathed asset values among Japanese 
decedents whose assets are subject to inheritance taxation is composed of real 
estate. On the other hand, only 25 percent of U.S. bequests subject to estate 
tax are composed of real estate (see Barthold and Ito [1992] for detailed insti- 
tutional differences and simulation results). In sum, the bequest taxation code 
in Japan gives an incentive for the elderly with bequest motive to accumulate 
real estate after retirement, the opposite of the prediction of the pure life-cycle 
model. Evidence thus supports the existence of bequest motives. 
Thus, for one reason or another, owner-occupied housing is not likely to be 
liquidated in Japan. Getting a reverse mortgage (borrowing money with a con- 
tract to pay off by bequeathing a house to the lender) is difficult, presumably 
because of  asymmetric information problems and moral hazard in housing 
maintenance.  I6 
6.6  Conclusion 
This paper identifies government tax incentives for household saving and 
the historical changes in these incentives. Our findings can be summarized 
as follows. 
1. Tax incentives for financial savings have been reduced since April 1988, 
15. The bequest tax or inheritance tax is imposed when the total amount of inheritance exceeds 
40 million yen plus 8 million yen times the number of statutory heirs, which is the basic deduction. 
Total tax liabilities are calculated in the following way:  (1) assign the total tax base (property 
values after all deductions and exemptions) to each statutory heir by the statutory share, (2) apply 
the following tax schedule to the assigned amount for each heir to calculate a tax amount for each 
heir, (3) deduct any tax credit from this individual tax amount, and (4)  sum up the individual tax 
amounts to arrive at the total inheritance tax liability. The schedule starts at 10  percent for the first 
4 million yen. The marginal rate goes up to 70 percent at 500 million yen. For details, see Barthold 
and It0 (1992). 
16. A particular form of  reverse mortgage  was introduced  in Musashino City  (a suburb of 
Tokyo). So such a contract is called the Musashino-type mortgage. However, not very many people 
have taken advantage of the system, and all contracts end with an option that the heirs buy back 
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while tax incentives for housing were strengthened in the tax reform. This 
reform might contribute to household wealth holdings skewed toward housing. 
2. The reduction of  tax incentives for financial savings did not seem to 
change household saving behavior by a significant magnitude. 
3. The Japanese household sector is very risk-averse in general. This fact 
seems to explain the seeming insensitivity of Japanese households to the real 
rate of  return from savings. If we remove the risk-aversion factor, Japanese 
households allocate their portfolios in a rational way. 
4. To  a certain extent, a household’s portfolio selection might indicate its 
sensitivity to the real rate of return from savings during financial liberalization 
coupled with the stock market boom in the 1980s. 
5. Intergenerational transfers have been made in substantial amounts in Ja- 
pan. With institutional impediments and favorable tax treatments, the elderly 
tend to accumulate (rather than decumulate) wealth, especially in the form of 
housing, until the very end of their lives. 
6. In the presence of large intergenerational transfers, the life-cycle theory 
of saving becomes dubious. The story of steady decline of Japanese household 
savings in a rapidly aging society, supported by  the life-cycle theory, needs 
further testing to be validated. 
The work that remains to be done is concerned mainly with microlevel data 
analysis. The saving behavior of the elderly is of particular interest. The test 
for a bequest motive on the part of the elderly may help to explain the high 
saving rate in Japan. This analysis may  also give empirical support for the 
idea of  generational accounting advocated by  Kotlikoff (1992). Finally, and 
probably most important, the Japanese attitude toward risk must be analyzed 
and identified in the microdata. Portfolio selection by  income class, by  age, 
and by  wealth may give important information about the degree of risk aver- 
sion. This may also supply an explanation for the high saving rate in Japan. 
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